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ABSTRACT—Investors in a market frequently update their diverse perceptions of the 
values of risky assets, thus invalidating the classic CAPM’s assumption of complete 
agreement among investors.  To accommodate information asymmetry and belief 
updating, we have developed an empirically testable Information-adjusted CAPM, 
which states that the expected excess return of a risky asset/portfolio is solely 
determined by information-adjusted beta rather than market beta.  The model is then 
used to analyze empirical anomalies of the classic CAPM, including a flatter relation 
between average return and market beta than the CAPM predicts, a non-zero Jensen’s 
alpha, insignificant explanatory power of market beta, and size effect. 
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I.  Introduction 
 The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is one of the corner stones of modern 
finance theory.  The Sharpe-Lintner version of the CAPM (Sharpe (1964) and Lintner 
(1965)) postulates that the expected return on a risky asset or a portfolio of assets is a 
linear function of its market beta, with a positive slope equal to the expected excess 
return on the market portfolio and an intercept equal to the riskless interest rate.  It 
implies that market beta is the only variable which can and is required to explain the 
systematic risk of securities.  However, such an insightful and elegant theory has met 
great challenges in empirical tests.
1
  Empirical evidence shows that the slope in a 
regression of return on market beta is small, resulting in a much flatter regression line 
than the theoretical security market line.  The intercept of such regressions 
systematically deviates from the riskless rate.  Many studies also report that market beta 
does not have power in explaining return variation.  Other variables, including the size 
of a security, play a substantial role in explaining return variation and have even greater 
explanatory power than market beta.   
Like other theories, the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM is built on a series of assumptions 
simplifying the complexity of the real world.  Among them, two assumptions are 
relatively restrictive.   
―The first assumption is complete agreement: given market clearing asset 
prices at t − 1, investors agree on the joint distribution of asset returns from t 
− 1 to t.  And this distribution is the true one—that is, it is the distribution 
from which the returns we use to test the model are drawn.  The second 
assumption is that there is borrowing and lending at a risk-free rate, which 
is the same for all investors and does not depend on the amount borrowed or 
lent.‖  (Fama and French (2004), p. 26.  Italic is original.) 
Black (1972) replaces the second assumption by assuming no risk-free asset and no 
risk-free borrowing or lending.  The Black version of the CAPM is consistent with a 
                                                 
1
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  3 
flatter slope between expected return and market beta and a non-zero Jensen’s alpha but 
it still cannot explain other anomalies reported in empirical studies.
2
 
 This paper intends to relax the complete agreement assumption and develop a 
new asset pricing model with improved predictions.  Hence, it is assumed that no 
investor in a financial market knows the true distribution of asset returns.  But they 
receive signals revealing the information of the true values of risky assets.  Investors 
incorporate the new information with their prior beliefs to refine their knowledge of the 
market and security returns.  Because investors may receive asymmetric information, 
their posterior beliefs about the return distribution are heterogeneous.   
 When the assumption of complete agreement is relaxed, the information 
received by investors or more precisely the distribution of information index is crucial.  
The information index of a risky asset depicts the effective information possessed by 
investors.
3
  If the information index takes the same value across all securities because of 
certain very particular market conditions, the market beta captures the systematic risk of 
an asset, in turn, the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM holds.  However, the information index 
generally varies across securities so that the systematic risk of an asset cannot be 
properly measured by the market beta.  Hence, we need to introduce a new benchmark 
portfolio—the Information-adjusted Market Portfolio (IaMP).  The weight on each 
risky asset in the IaMP is characterized by the product of the information index of the 
asset and its weight in the market portfolio.  With this new benchmark portfolio, we 
analytically derive the Information-adjusted CAPM (IaCAPM), which states that the 
expected return on a risky asset/portfolio is a linear function of its information-adjusted 
beta, with a slope equal to the expected excess return on the IaMP and an intercept 
equal to the riskless interest rate.  The information-adjusted beta measures the 
systematic risk of an asset and is defined as the covariance between returns on the asset 
and the IaMP divided by the variance of return on the IaMP.  The IaMP plays a similar 
role as the market portfolio in the classic CAPM and the IaCAPM remains a single-
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 The information index is formally defined as the ratio of the unconditional precision of a security’s 
return to the mean of the conditional precision of the return.  The details are given in Section III. 
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factor market model.  Nevertheless, the factor that causes systematic return differences 
across assets is the information-adjusted beta. 
 The IaCAPM implies that in empirical tests of an asset pricing model, the 
regression of return should be on information-adjusted beta rather than market beta in 
cross-sectional analysis, or on excess return on the IaMP rather than excess market 
return in time-series analysis.  When market beta or excess market return is chosen as an 
explanatory variable, the model essentially turns out to be a random coefficient 
regression model.  This is likely to be one of main reasons for various anomalies 
discovered in the empirical tests of the classic CAPM.  Proposition 4 in the paper 
specifies the conditions under which the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM overstates or 
understates the expected return on a risky security or a portfolio of securities, and 
quantify the prediction error.  Based on this proposition, Section IV analyzes the 
possible reasons for the empirical anomalies discovered in the literature.   
We adopt the approach of rational expectations analysis to relax the assumption 
of complete agreement.  Following the pioneering works of Grossman (1976), and 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), rational expectations models developed by, for example, 
Hellwig (1980), Admati (1985), Easley and O’Hara (2004), focus on the effect of 
asymmetric information on capital asset pricing.  They usually assume that the prices of 
risky assets and signals conveying price information are normally distributed random 
variables.  The normal distributions, accompanied by constant absolute risk aversion 
utility, can generate elegant linear demand functions and a closed-form solution for 
conditional expectations of relevant variables.  Although they have been successfully 
used to demonstrate that the conditional CAPM (i.e., expectations are taken conditional 
on investors’ posterior beliefs) holds in various variants (e.g., Admati (1985)), they can 
hardly be applied to the analysis of unconditional expected return.
4
  The reason is that 
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 It is important to distinguish unconditional expectation from conditional expectation.  Equilibrium 
prices of risky assets depend on a particular realization of random informative signals and random asset 
supplies in a one-period model.  So, conditional on the realization of signals and supplies, the 
randomness of return on a risky asset stems solely from the randomness of the future value (or future 
price) of the asset.  For unconditional expected return, however, the expectation operation should be 
taken over all random variables and in turn the equilibrium prices should be considered as random too.  
See, for example, Easley and O’Hara (2004). 
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the assumption of normally distributed prices ultimately results in a distribution of 
returns for which unconditional expectation does not exist.
5
  To avoid this difficulty, 
Easley and O’Hara (2004) focus on the analysis of unconditional expected return per 
share instead of the rate of return.  (Throughout the paper, return means the rate of 
return unless otherwise specified.)   
The importance of developing an asset pricing model based on unconditional 
expectations is twofold.  First, as Jagannathan and Wang (1996) and Campbell (2000) 
have pointed out, even if the conditional CAPM is assumed to be true the return-beta 
relationship in the classic CAPM usually does not hold when expectations are taken 
unconditionally.  Secondly, an equilibrium based on conditional expectations depends 
on a particular realization of random parameters and variables.  But most empirical 
tests, which disclose various anomalies of the classic CAPM as represented by Fama 
and French (1992, 1993), implicitly require an asset pricing model established on 
unconditional expectations.
6
  In order to develop an unconditional asset pricing model 
and circumvent the difficulty caused by the normal distribution assumption, we extend 
the Easley-O’Hara (2004) model by adopting lognormal distributions of asset values 
and informative signals.  We show that although the conditional CAPM does hold in 
our framework, as found by other asset pricing models of rational expectations 
equilibrium, the unconditional CAPM has to be modified to accommodate belief 
diversity among investors. 
The rest of the paper is organized as the follows.  Section II specifies the 
Bayesian belief updating process based on lognormally distributed signals.  Then it 
completes an asymmetric information model by establishing rational expectations 
equilibrium.  Section III calculates conditional and unconditional expected returns in 
equilibrium, and derives the IaCAPM by dropping the assumption of complete 
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 Simple return involves the ratio of random future value to random equilibrium price and its 
unconditional expectation is not computable because even for two independent standard normal variables 
their ratio follows a Cauchy distribution, for which both mean and variance do not exist (Hogg and Craig 
(1995), p. 174).  Continuously compounded return is not well-defined due to the negative range of normal 
variates. 
6
 Of course, empirical test methods for conditional asset pricing models have been well developed; see for 
instance, Cochrane (2005). 
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agreement.  It also discusses the main properties and predictions of the IaCAPM.  
Section IV analyzes the anomalies documented in the empirical analysis of the classic 
CAPM from the IaCAPM perspective.  Concluding remarks are given in the final 
section.  Proofs of propositions and corollaries are given in Appendix A. 
 
II.  Belief Updating and Rational Expectations Equilibrium 
A.  Bayesian Inference  
Consider a market of K risky assets and one risk-free asset.  Agents in this 
market optimize their asset portfolios through trading securities at date 0 to maximize 
their expected utility at date 1.  Although nobody knows the future values of risky 
assets, vk (k = 1,…, K), before trading, their prior distributions are common knowledge.  
It is assumed that vk are independently, lognormally distributed,
7
 i.e., 
),ln(~ln 1kkk vNv  ,   k = 1,…, K.         (1) 
There are kI  signals revealing the information of the future value of risky asset k before 
trading.  These signals, 1ks , 2ks , …, kkIs , are drawn independently from a lognormal 
distribution, conditional on a realization of vk, i.e., 
),(ln~|ln 1kkkkj vNvs  , j = 1,…, Ik.         (2) 
Some of these signals are public information observed by all investors in the market but 
the others are private and observed only by a portion of investors.  The fraction of 
private signals is denoted by k  so that the fraction of signals publicly observable is 
k1 .  Investors who can observe both private and public signals of asset k are called 
informed investors, whereas investors who only observe public signals are called 
uninformed investors.
8
  To facilitate analysis and simplify notations, we define two 
statistics of these signals: 
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 The assumption of independent distributions of asset values has also been adopted by other studies of 
asset pricing; for instance, Easley and O’Hara (2004) and O’Hara (2003).  The introduction of 
correlations between risky assets does not change the core result of the paper—the IaCAPM and its 
predictions.  Appendix B to this paper, which is available upon request, outlines the derivation of the 
IaCAPM and other main results when all risky assets and signals are correlated.  However, the 
assumption of independent distributions can greatly simplify algebra and ease the exposition of economic 
intuition.  So, we keep it throughout the main text. 
8
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It can be easily verified that kg  and kh  are normal, conditional on vk, that 
 1)(,ln~| kkkkkk IvNvg  ,   k = 1,…, K,       (3) 
 1])1([,ln~|  kkkkkk IvNvh  ,  k = 1,…, K.       (4) 
Since kg  and kh  are sufficient statistics for the collections of private signals and public 
signals, respectively, we only need to investigate these two sufficient statistics, instead 
of considering signals 1ks , 2ks , …, kkIs  individually. 
 Informed investors can use both private information kg  and public information 
kh  to update their beliefs on the future values of risky assets.  Thus, applying Bayes’ 
rule they have the following posterior belief on asset k:  
 1)(,ln~),(|ln Ik
I
kkk
i
k vNhgv  ,   if inventor i is informed,     (5) 
where the conditional mean and conditional precision are given by 
I
kkkkkkkkkkk
I
k hIgIvv  ])1(ln[ln  ,        (6) 
kkk
I
k I  .             (7) 
 Uninformed investors only receive public information, hk.  But the equilibrium 
prices of risky assets partially reveal the information contained in private signals.  So, 
they use both hk and price signals to update their beliefs.  Let pk be the equilibrium price 
of risky asset k.  Assume that the supply of the k
th
 asset in terms of its total value, yk, is 
a normal random variable, independent of other random variables, with mean 0ky  
and precision k .
9
  Suppose that uninformed investors conjecture the following 
equilibrium price (it will be verified later that this conjecture is self-fulfilling): 
 kykykhkgkvk yByBhBgBvBp  lnln ,        (8) 
where Bv, Bg, Bh, By and yB  are constants and will be given in Proposition 1 below.
10
  
To facilitate analysis, we define a random variable that  
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 It is well-known that the market must have some noise to avoid a perfectly revealing equilibrium.  
Asymmetric information models (e.g., Admati (1985), Easley and O’Hara (2004)) typically assume that 
the number of per-capita supply of a stock is a normal random variable.  Since the supply randomness is 
usually considered as the result of trading by liquidity traders who buy or sell an asset for their liquidity 
purposes, regardless of its price, assuming random total supply value seems reasonable if it is not more 
plausible.  The assumption 0ky  implies a positive supply on average. 
10
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   gyykkhkvkk BBByhBvBp )(lnln  gykkk BByyg )(  .     (9) 
Since uninformed investors can compute k  by price and public information, observing 
signal k  is equivalent to observing price signal pk.  It is clear that 
 kgykkkkkk vBByyEvgEvE ln])([)|()|(  , 
 11121 ])()[()]|[var(   kkkkgykkk IBBv  . 
Thus, ),(ln~|
1
kkkk vNv  .  From public information and signal k , the uninformed 
investors form their posterior beliefs on asset k as:  
  1)(,ln~),(|ln Uk
U
kkk
i
k vNhv  ,      if inventor i is uninformed.    (10) 
In (10), the conditional mean and conditional precision can be expressed as  
U
kkkkkkkkk
U
k hIvv   ])1(ln[ln  ,      (11) 
kkkkk
U
k I   )1( .         (12) 
As expected, (6) and (11) show that the posterior mean is a weighted average of prior 
mean and signals’ means while (7) and (12) demonstrate that the posterior precision is 
the sum of prior precision and signals’ precisions.  
 
B.  Investors’ Optimal Portfolios   
Let investor i’s initial wealth endowment be im .  If he/she allocates ikx  dollars 
to asset k (k = 1, 2, …, K) and i
fx  dollars to the risk-free asset at date 0, his/her wealth 
at date 1 is 
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where the risk-free asset is assumed to be the numeraire and has a zero return.  To 
compute investors’ demands for assets, we assume that they have identical utility with 
constant absolute risk aversion, )exp()( wwu  , where δ > 0 is the Arrow-Pratt 
measure of absolute risk aversion.  Substituting (13) into the utility function, the 
expected utility of investor i can be expressed as 
 
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where i  is the information set of investor i at the time he/she is making investment 
decision.
11
  In deriving (14), we have noticed that the return on asset k, )ln( kkk pvr  , 
is conditionally normal so that (5) and (10) imply  
k
i
kk
i
k pvpvE lnlnln)|(ln  ,  
1)()|var(ln  ik
i
kv  . 
Thus, the maximization of (14) yields the optimal investment strategy for investor i:  
   k
i
k
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k
i
k pvx lnln  , k = 1,…, K,  

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K
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1
.   (15) 
In (15), 
i
kvln  and 
i
k  are determined by (6)-(7) or (11)-(12), depending on whether 
investor i receives private signals of asset k or not.  The optimal investment (15) is well 
behaved and has the properties as expected.  It shows that an investor invests more in an 
asset as the expectation of the logarithm of its future value increases and/or the 
uncertainty becomes smaller.  The investment also increases when the conditional 
expected return, k
i
k pv lnln  , is higher.  However, when the price of an asset rises, the 
relative investment in this particular asset declines.  As the investor is more risk-averse, 
he/she reduces his/her investment across all risky assets and increases his/her holding of 
the risk-free asset.  By simple manipulation, we find that investor i choose the following 
optimal portfolio of risky assets: 
 k
i
k
i
k
ii
k pvt lnln   ,  k = 1,…, K,      (16) 
where 
1
1
lnln












  
K
k k
i
k
i
k
i pv  is the normalization coefficient. 
 
C.  Rational Expectations Equilibrium 
Normalize the total number of investors to 1, with k  investors observing both 
private and public signals of asset k and k1  investors observing public signals only 
(k = 1,…, K).  We consider rational expectations equilibrium; i.e., each investor’s 
expectation is self-fulfilling in equilibrium.  The market clearing condition requires the 
aggregate demand for each asset equal to its aggregate supply, i.e., 
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utility are second-order small.  The proof (Appendix C) is available upon request.  Intuitively, the 
approximation is equivalent to approximating simple return by continuously compounded return.  
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Recalling (6), (7), (11) and (12), we obtain the equilibrium prices after inserting optimal 
investment in (15) into (17).  This is summarized in Proposition 1 below. 
PROPOSITION 1.  There exists a partially revealing rational expectations equilibrium in 
which, 
 kykykhkgkvk yByBhBgBvBp  lnln , k = 1,…, K,    (18) 
where coefficients B’s are given in the proof of the proposition in Appendix A. 
The price formula in equation (18) has a standard form, the fundamental value 
of the security less the supply pressure.  The fundamental value consists of three 
components, the prior value (
kvln ), the private (gk) and public (hk) signals.  They are 
incorporated into the equilibrium price in a form of weighted average as the weights, 
Bv, Bg and Bh add up to one.  The supply pressure component, )( kyky yByB  , 
represents the price discount the investors require to hold the risky security.  The larger 
the supply yk relative to its mean ky , the larger the discount. 
 
III.  The Information-adjusted CAPM 
A.  Expected Returns 
Conditional on his/her information, investor i’s expected return on asset k is  
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The corresponding precisions are 
I
k  and 
U
k , respectively, for informed and 
uninformed investors.  Therefore, an investor with the private information of asset k 
believes that the return follows a normal distribution ))(,(
1I
k
I
krN   whereas an 
uniformed investor believes the distribution is ))(,(
1U
k
U
krN  .  Since there are k  
investors with information precision 
I
k  and k1  investors with precision 
U
k , the 
average conditional belief, following Lintner (1969), and Easley and O’Hara (2004), 
can be defined as, 
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k rrr  ])1([  ,        (20) 
 )1( k
U
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M
k   .         (21) 
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Because investors make their investment decision by maximizing their conditional 
mean-variance utility, it is obvious that the risky portfolio }{ ikt  as characterized by (16) 
is the tangency portfolio of investor i, according to his/her posterior belief of returns on 
risky assets.  Moreover, applying the result of conditional mean-variance efficiency of 
each investor’s investment decision it can be easily shown that the Sharpe-Lintner 
CAPM conditionally holds for the average conditional belief in (20)-(21); that is, the 
conditional expectation of excess return on a portfolio of risky assets is equal to the 
conditional expectation of market excess return times the conditional market beta of the 
portfolio.  A similar result is also obtained by other rational expectations models such 
as Admati (1985).  However, the main interest of this paper is to develop an asset 
pricing model that holds unconditionally.  For this end, we first need to find out the 
unconditional expected returns on all individual risky assets, which will be given in 
Proposition 2 below.  Secondly, we have to determine what factors summarize the 
systemic risk of an asset or a portfolio.  To deal with this, we, following the classic 
CAPM, identify a portfolio in the next subsection that captures the supply and 
information characteristics of the entire market so that it plays the same role as the 
market portfolio does in the classic CAPM.   
PROPOSITION 2.  The unconditional expected value and precision of return rk on asset k 
(k = 1,…, K) are given by 
M
k
k
kkkkkkkkkk
k
k
y
II
y
r


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

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,      (22) 
12222 ])1([  kykkkhkkkgkvk BIBIBB  .     (23) 
Proposition 2 says that the unconditional expected return is the product of risk 
aversion (δ), riskiness (   1Mk ) and the mean of supply ( ky ).  It increases as the 
investors become more risk averse (larger δ), the payoff becomes riskier (smaller Mk ), 
and/or they have to accommodate more supply on average (larger ky ).  The 
unconditional variance of the return is a weighted sum of the prior variance of asset 
value (
1
k ), and the variances of private signals (  
1
kkk I  ), public signal 
  1)1((  kkk I  ) and security supply (
1
k ). 
  12 
 
B.  The Information-adjusted CAPM 
Once the assumption of complete agreement is relaxed, the information 
structure of a market is vital.  Two parameters responsible for the characteristics of 
information in the market are conditional and unconditional precisions, 
M
k  and k , 
respectively.  Conditional precision 
M
k  reflects the accuracy of the knowledge about 
the future value of stock k a posteriori once signals are received but does not capture 
the variability due to different realizations of signals.  On the other hand, unconditional 
precision k  reflects the total precision of the future value but does not reveal how 
much information can be extracted from a particular realization of signals in statistical 
inference.  Therefore, we define information index as the ratio of unconditional 
precision to conditional precision, 
M
kkk  / , to depict the effective information 
about asset k possessed by investors.  For a risky portfolio  kt , the information index 
is defined as     
K
k kk
K
k
M
kkP 11
 , where  
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j jjkkk
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1
  (k = 1,…, 
K).  Clearly, P  reduces to k  if the portfolio includes risky asset k only.  The 
justification for the information index as a suitable measure of the amount of 
information on a security or a portfolio can be further seen from Lemma 1 in the next 
section.  It attains a maximum of 1 (or a minimum of 0) if the amount of the 
information (or, more precisely, the total information quality as defined in Lemma 1) is 
infinite (or zero). 
Based on the information index, we can introduce the information-adjusted 
market portfolio to incorporate information effects.  Since the average market supply of 
assets k is ky  (k = 1,…, K), each weight in the market portfolio is given by kM
M
k yt  , 
where   1
1


K
k kM
y  is the normalization constant.  Consequently, the IaMP,  Akt , is 
defined as the market portfolio adjusted for the information index; i.e., 
A
kt  is equal to 
k
M
kt  , up to a normalization constant.  By choosing the normalization constant 
  1
1


K
k kkA
y  , we obtain kkA
A
k yt  .  Generally, an asset with more (less) 
information revealed to the market has a larger (smaller) weight in the IaMP than in the 
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market portfolio.  The definition of the IaMP captures the aggregate characteristics of 
the market: the distributions of both market supply and information index across 
securities.   
PROPOSITION 3.  Under the assumptions of the modeled market, the following IaCAPM  
 AkAk rr  ,  k = 1, 2, …, K,       (24) 
holds, where k
K
k
A
kA rtr   1  is the unconditional expected return on the IaMP, 
AAkA
A
k    is the information-adjusted beta, k
A
kkA t    is the covariance between 
returns on asset k and on the IaMP, and   
K
k k
A
kAA t1
2
  is the variance of return 
on the IaMP.  The IaMP is mean-variance efficient with respect to mean kr  and 
precision k .  For a portfolio }{ kt , the IaCAPM also holds that  
 APAP rr  ,           (25) 
where  
K
k kkP
rtr
1
 and  
K
k
A
kk
A
P t1   are the unconditional expected return and 
the information-adjusted beta of the portfolio. 
  
Remarks on the Information-adjusted CAPM 
1. It is the information-adjusted beta, rather than the market beta, that can solely 
explain the systematic variation in returns and no other factor is required to explain 
the variation.  The unconditional expected excess return on an asset is proportionate 
to its information-adjusted beta, and the beta premium is positive and equal to the 
unconditional expected excess return on the IaMP.   
2. The essential difference between the IaCAPM and the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM is that 
the market portfolio and market beta are replaced by the IaMP and information-
adjusted beta.  In the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM, investors are symmetric and are 
supposed to know the true joint distribution of returns.  Under this information 
environment, all investors hold an identical portfolio in equilibrium.  Consequently, 
the systematic variation in the return on an individual asset is completely captured 
by its covariance with the market return.  Nevertheless, when investors do not have 
complete agreement on asset returns, investors in the market have to collect 
information to update their beliefs.  This results in diverse information indexes.  The 
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covariance of the return on a security with the market return, or the market beta, 
cannot capture this information effect on the market and in turn the market beta 
cannot properly reveal the systematic risk a stock.  Instead, Proposition 3 asserts 
that the systematic variation of returns is jointly captured by the information index 
and market capitalization, or more precisely, the information-adjusted beta.   
3. The IaCAPM established in Proposition 3 is empirically testable.  The difference 
between the tests of the IaCAPM and the classic CAPM is the former needs 
information index to construct the IaMP.  By definition, information index k  is 
equal to 
M
kk  / , where k  and 
M
k  are constant and do not include any state 
variables or information signals received by investors.  Since k  is the inverse of 
the unconditional variance of return, it can be easily estimated by conventional 
methods.  On the other hand, 
M
k  may be estimated by high frequency return data.  
Therefore, econometricians would be able to empirically test the IaCAPM ex post 
without knowing observations available only to market participants or utilizing 
macroeconomic variables revealing the state of the market.   
4. The importance of the IaMP can also be seen from its mean-variance efficiency 
with respect to the belief ( kr , k ), as indicated in Proposition 3.  Note that Easley 
and O’Hara (2004) shows that the market portfolio is mean-variance efficient with 
respect to mean kr  and precision 
M
k  although the return in their model is defined as 
return per share.  It is not hard to demonstrate that the market portfolio in our model 
has a similar property.  However, the unconditional mean kr  and conditional 
precision 
M
k  do not constitute a well-defined belief because it is the pair ( kr , k ) 
rather than the pair ( kr ,
M
k ) that forms the unconditional mean and unconditional 
precision of random variable rk. 
To illustrate the significance of Proportions 3, let us consider an imaginary 
market, where all investors are risk averse and have an absolute risk-aversion 
coefficient of 1 .  There are 25 stocks in the market with means of supplies equal to 
255.0 kyk   (k = 1, …, 25).  Average conditional precisions of stock returns are set 
at 1.0Mk  while unconditional precisions are determined by kk U09.001.0  , 
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where kU  (k = 1, …, 25) are independent uniform variates on [0, 1].  Then, the 
information index can be calculated by definition Mkkk    and unconditional 
expected returns are found by Proportion 2 that kk yr 10 .  The weights of the market 
portfolio and IaMP are determined by their definitions that  
25
1j jk
M
k yyt  and 
 
25
1
/
j jjkk
A
k yyt  .  Market beta 
M
k  and information-adjusted beta 
A
k  can be 
calculated from the market portfolio and IaMP, respectively.  Figure 1a below depicts 
the scatter plot of 25 pairs of market beta-returns ),( k
M
k r  we have generated, which 
simulates observed market beta-return relationship in a real market and exhibits 
conventional anomalies well-known in the literature.  For instance, the 25 points do not 
fall on a nominal straight line as predicted by the classical CAPM, indicating other 
explanatory variables are required to explain the variation of return; the regression line 
of these 25 stocks is much flatter than the market security line of Sharp-Lintner CAPM.  
However, if the scatter plot is drawn against information-adjusted beta rather than 
market beta, then our simulated data show the corresponding 25 pairs of ),( k
A
k r  fall 
exactly on the straight line of the IaCAPM, as shown in Figure 1b.  This example 
demonstrates that it is the information-adjusted beta, rather than the market beta, that 
can solely explain the systematic variation in returns.   
 
Figure 1 is about here 
 
C.  The Inaccuracy of the Predictions of the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM 
PROPOSITION 4.  When the information index varies across securities, there exists a 
unique )1,0(*  such that the relative prediction error made by the Sharpe-Lintner 
CAPM on the expected return on a portfolio is proportionate to |*|  P , i.e.  
*  P
M
PM
M
PMP crrr , 
where MAAMAMMA rrc   is a constant across all securities.  Moreover, for a 
portfolio with a positive market beta (i.e., 0MP ), the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM 
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overstates the unconditional expected return on the portfolio if *),0(  P , whereas it 
understates the return if )1*,( P .
12
   
 If all k  are equal, the IaCAPM collapses to the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM.  
Based on the data used in Figure 1,
13
 Table 1 displays the absolute and relative 
prediction errors of the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM.  It can be seen from the upper panel of 
the table that when 31.0*  k  ( 31.0*  k ) the prediction errors are negative 
(positive) so that the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM overstates (understates) unconditional 
expected returns.  The lower panel of the table demonstrates the conclusion of 
Proposition 4 that the relative error made by the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM increases 
monotonically and is proportionate to |*|  P . 
 
Table 1 is about here 
 
IV.  Why Does the Classic CAPM Fail in Empirical Tests? 
The IaCAPM suggests that empirical tests should be carried out by regressing 
excess return on information-adjusted beta in cross-sectional analysis or on the risk 
premium of the IaMP in time-series analysis.  When regressions use market beta or 
market excess return as the only explanatory variable, they fail to capture the cross-
sectional variability in information quality, as indicated in Proposition 4.  This may be 
partially responsible for various anomalies discovered in the existing tests of the classic 
CAPM.  This section details the IaCAPM’s explanation to these anomalies.   
 
A.  Why Is the Slope of Empirical Relation between Market Beta and Average Return So 
Flat? 
The first anomaly we are going to examine is the empirical finding of the flatter 
slope, i.e., beta premium obtained in cross-sectional analysis is much smaller than the 
                                                 
12
 There are other sufficient conditions for the prediction of the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM overstating or 
understating returns.  But only considering these two scenarios is enough for our purpose because market 
betas and weights of portfolios are generally positive in empirical studies cited in the next section. 
13
 An additional ingredient is ω*, which is equal to 0.31 according to the calculation shown in the proof 
of Proposition 4. 
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average excess market return (see, Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972), and Fama French 
(1992)).  To facilitate the analysis, let us introduce a measure of the absolute 
information quality of a risky security, i.e., the total information precision of asset k, 
kkkk I  .  Correspondingly, the information quality of a portfolio is defined by a 
harmonic average of individual qualities,   1
1
1||



K
k kkP
 .  There is a close 
relationship between the information index and information quality, as demonstrated by 
the lemma below. 
LEMMA 1.  For each asset, information index k  and information quality k  have the 
following properties: (i) 1k  and k  if k  and kkk
I
I
k
kk



/lim


 
exists;
14
 (ii) 0k  and 0k  if 0k ; (iii) 10  k .  For a portfolio, the 
corresponding properties are: (iv) 1P  if P  and kkk
I
I
k
kk





lim  exist for 
all k; (v) 0P  if 0P ; (vi) 10  P  if 0kt  for all k. 
To see why the empirical line is flatter, we rewrite the IaCAPM as 
 MPMPP rcr  ,           (26) 
where PP cc   and constant c is given in Proposition 4.  Since in empirical studies 
market betas and unconditional expected returns are positive, if we can demonstrate that 
the value of Pc  tends to be greater and smaller than 1 for small and large 
M
P , 
respectively, the flatter slope puzzle is, at least partially, resolved.  Recall that 
Proposition 4 specifies two distinct areas of information index P , where the Sharpe-
Lintner CAPM overstate or understate expected return.  Thus, using the link between 
information index P  and information quality P  established in Lemma 1, we can 
easily determine the condition for the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM overstating or understating 
the expected return in Corollary 1 via the bridge of Proposition 5 below. 
PROPOSITION 5.  There exist two constants, L  and U  (  UL 0 ), such that  
(i) the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM overstates the expected return on a portfolio (i.e., 
1Pc ) if the portfolio’s information quality P  is low and within ) ,0[ L ; 
                                                 
14
 This includes the existence of an infinite limit. 
  18 
(ii) the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM understates the expected return on a portfolio (i.e., 
1Pc ) if the portfolio’s information quality P  is high and within ) ,( U . 
According to Proposition 5, we can define two sets of portfolios 
   with portfolios LPLP    and    with portfolios UPUP   .  Thus, another 
way to express Proposition 5 is that the expected returns on portfolios in LP  are 
overstated by the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM whereas the expected returns on portfolios in 
UP  are understated.  Because portfolios in set LP  tend to have a large market beta while 
their counterparts in UP  tend to have a small market beta, the following corollary 
connects the over- or under-statement of the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM with the market 
beta. 
COROLLARY 1.  There exists a constant, U , such that ) ,(  U
M
P   for all portfolios 
in set LP ; that is, portfolios whose unconditional expected returns are overstated by the 
Sharpe-Lintner CAPM tend to have a large market beta.  There also exists a 
constant, L , such that ) ,0[ L
M
P    for all portfolios in UP ; that is, portfolios whose 
expected returns are understated by the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM tend to have a small 
market beta . 
  
B.  Why Does the Effect of Market Beta on the Average Return Tend to Be Statistically 
Insignificant? 
The classic CAPM claims that the beta premium is positive.  Statistically, this 
claim is valid if the null hypothesis,  
H0:  0b  
can be rejected in the following cross-sectional analysis  
 P
M
PP bar   ,  with ),0(~
2
PP N        (27) 
for pre-selected portfolios P (P = 1, 2, …, N).  Note that the corresponding t-test 
statistic for testing the above null hypothesis is  
 
2/1
2/1
1
2
1
)}{var(
ˆ
P
N
j
N
i
M
i
M
j
r
Nb
t














 
 

,         (28) 
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where the variance of return, )var( Pr , is equal to 
2
P  if the slope b  in (27) is assumed 
to be constant across portfolios, as done in the existing cross-sectional analysis, and bˆ  
is the least squares estimate of b . 
Unfortunately, finance literature has documented that the data collected for 
empirical analysis are often unable to reject the above null hypothesis (see, for instance, 
Fama and French, 1992, p. 428).  To understand why the null hypothesis of 0b  
cannot be rejected in theory, let us return to equation (26).  According to it, observed 
data on return and market beta in cross-sectional analysis do not follow a regression 
equation with a constant slope as assumed by (27).  Rather, the slope in (26), MPrc , 
varies across portfolios.  Hence, if the explanatory variable is market beta rather than 
information-adjusted beta, a random-coefficient regression model is more appropriate 
than a constant slope model as implied by the classic CAPM.  Such a random-
coefficient regression model involves a two-level regression.
15
  Level 1 relates the 
return on portfolio P to its market beta, 
Level 1: 
P
M
PPP bar      with ),0(~
2
PP N  . 
Level 2 postulates a statistical model describing the portfolio-to-portfolio variation of 
the slope caused by unevenly distributed information across portfolios, 
Level 2:  )(~ PP Fb  , 
where )( PF   is the distribution of the information index.  According to this two-level 
regression model, the actual data on return have a variance greater than 2P  since 
 )}|(var{)}|{var()var( PPPPP brEbrEr  
22 )}|(var{ PPPP brE    . 
Consequently, it leads to a smaller value of t-test statistic in (28).  This explain, to some 
extent, why econometricians often cannot reject the null hypothesis of 0b .  
 
C.  Why Is Jensen’s Alpha Not Equal to Zero? 
We now turn to time-series regression for a portfolio, P, 
 PtMt
M
PPPt rar   ,  t = 1, 2, …      (29) 
                                                 
15
 See Fitzmaurice, Laid and Ware (2004) for an overview about random-coefficient regression analysis. 
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where intercept Pa  should be zero according to the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM.  However, 
the regularity found in time-series regressions of excess portfolio return on excess 
market return is that the intercepts are positive when portfolios have low market betas 
but negative when portfolios have high betas (Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972), Fama 
and French (2004)).  The IaCAPM may shed light on this conflict between theory and 
empirical findings.  To demonstrate this, let us rewrite equation (25) as 
 M
M
PM
M
PA
A
PP rrrr   ][ ,         (30) 
which implies that the intercept in equation (29) is given by 
)1(  PM
M
PM
M
PA
A
PP crrra  ,  
Hence, applying Proposition 5 and Corollary 1 immediately yields the corollary below: 
COROLLARY 2.  The intercept of the time-series regression (29) is  
(i) negative and its market beta is large (i.e. ) ,(  U
M
P  ) for a portfolio with low 
information quality (i.e. LP   ); 
(ii) positive and its market beta is small (i.e. ) ,0[ L
M
P   ) for a portfolio with high 
information quality (i.e. LP   ). 
 
D. Does Size Matter? 
Starting from the late 1970s, a number of empirical evidences have shown that 
much of the variation in expected return is unrelated to the market beta.  One of most 
prominent anomalies in asset pricing literature is the relation between return and firm 
size, first discovered by Banz (1981) and Reinganum (1981).  For instance, Banz 
(1981), and Fama and French (1992) investigate a version of the following empirical 
model: 
kky
M
kk ybbar   ,   k = 1,…, K     
where a, b , and yb  are regression coefficients assumed to be constant in their cross-
sectional analysis.  They have found that size ky  is negatively correlated with return kr , 
termed the size effect in the literature.  Since the size effect was discovered first in the 
United States, it has been further confirmed in the United Kingdom and other markets.   
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To explain the size effect, we note that the IaCAPM in (30) implies the 
following equation,  
  kkMMkMMk
M
kMk yrcrr   )1( ,  k = 1,…, K.   
It is immediate from this equation that additional size variable ky  is required in order to 
explain the variation in return if we use market beta rather than information-adjusted 
beta to predict returns.  Moreover, it can be demonstrated that the coefficient of ky  in 
the above equation is negative on average (the details are available upon request).  This 
negative average size effect indicates that the IaCAPM’s prediction does not contradict 
with the empirical findings of the size effect. 
 
IV.  Concluding Remarks 
This paper develops a new asset pricing model based on unconditional statistical 
analysis and illustrates that the assumption of complete agreement among all investors 
in a market is likely to be one of the major reasons for various anomalies discovered in 
the empirical tests of the classic CAPM.  The reality of financial markets is that 
investors have diverse judgments and beliefs about the returns on risky assets and they 
frequently update their beliefs based on information they received.  By removing the 
assumption of complete agreement, the Information-adjusted CAPM concludes that the 
unconditional expected return on a risky asset or a portfolio of assets is solely 
determined by the information-adjusted beta rather than the market beta.  More 
specifically, it postulates that the unconditional expected return on a risky 
asset/portfolio is equal to the riskless interest rate plus the product of the information-
adjusted beta and the unconditional expected excess return on the IaMP.  Furthermore, 
the IaCAPM not only specifies the conditions under which the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM 
overstates or understates the expected return on a portfolio but also provides a formula 
to estimate the prediction error made by the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM.  From a practical 
perspective, the IaCAPM introduces a new approach to analyze the empirical anomalies 
of the classic CAPM, including a flatter relation between average return and market 
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beta than the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM predicts, a non-zero Jensen’s alpha, the lack of 
explanatory power of market beta, and the size effect. 
The empirical problems of the classic CAPM lead researchers to ask whether it 
is possible to empirically test the CAPM.  The famous Roll’s (1977) critique argues that 
the CAPM has never been and will probably never be tested because the theory of the 
CAPM does not clearly indicate which assets should be legitimately included in the 
market portfolio.  So, when a proxy is used in a test, the test is actually testing the 
mean-variance efficiency of the proxy rather than the validity of the CAPM.  In 
response to the Roll’s critique, econometricians have devoted great efforts in searching 
for a better proxy of the market portfolio.  Interestingly, various studies demonstrate 
that the test outcomes of the classic CAPM are not sensitive to the expansion of the 
market proxy beyond common stocks (Stambaugh (1982)).  Even for a market portfolio 
including international assets, market beta still cannot explain the anomalies of the 
classic CAPM (Fama and French (1998)).  While enlarging the ―market‖ coverage to 
include more assets into the market portfolio is likely to make it closer to the ―true‖ 
market portfolio, the IaCAPM suggests that the key for a successful test is not to extend 
the coverage of the market portfolio after it has a sufficiently large span.  Rather, 
correct weights of the benchmark portfolio are more important.  The market portfolio 
should be adjusted by the information index to reflect the uneven information 
distribution across assets.   
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    Figure 1a        Figure 1b 
Figure 1. Simulated return versus market beta or information-adjusted beta for a market of 25 stocks.  Figure 1a plots 25 
points of market beta-returns ),( k
M
k r  (k =1,…, 25), which simulates conventional market observations and anomalies.  Figure 1b 
depicts 25 pairs of information-adjusted beta-returns ),( k
A
k r  (k = 1,…, 25) for the same 25 stocks and they fall exactly on the 
straight-line of the IaCAPM. 
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k  0.106 0.110 0.114 0.132 0.146 0.185 0.191 0.235 0.244 0.285 0.299 0.328 0.445 
M
kMk rr   -12.072 -12.159 -15.753 -14.440 -10.678 -9.468 -4.740 -2.838 -4.095 -1.283 -0.656 0.254 2.922 
k  0.495 0.635 0.676 0.685 0.742 0.761 0.771 0.775 0.798 0.804 0.852 0.872  
M
kMk rr   3.764 6.401 8.070 3.154 7.059 4.126 4.878 7.761 4.744 6.970 6.964 7.574  
              
* k  0.014 0.015 0.027 0.068 0.078 0.122 0.127 0.133 0.166 0.180 0.183 0.199 0.203 
M
kM
M
kMk rrr   0.044 0.049 0.087 0.219 0.248 0.390 0.407 0.425 0.532 0.577 0.585 0.636 0.648 
* k  0.206 0.323 0.364 0.372 0.429 0.448 0.459 0.463 0.485 0.492 0.539 0.560  
M
kM
M
kMk rrr   0.661 1.033 1.165 1.192 1.373 1.435 1.468 1.481 1.553 1.573 1.726 1.792  
 
Table 1.  The absolute and relative prediction errors of the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM.  The upper panel shows that when 
31.0*  k  ( 31.0*  k ) the prediction errors of the Sharp-Lintner CAPM are negative (positive) so that the Sharpe-Lintner 
CAPM overstates (understates) unconditional expected returns.  The lower panel demonstrates the conclusion of Proposition 4 that the 
relative error made by the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM increases monotonically and is proportionate to |*|  k . 
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Appendix A.  Proofs of Propositions and Corollaries 
Proof of Proposition 1: Substituting equation (15) into (17), we obtain 
k
U
kk
I
kkk
U
k
U
kk
I
k
I
kk pyvv ln])1([ln)1(ln   .       (A1) 
Since 
U
kk
I
kk
M
k  )1(   as defined in (21), substituting (6)-(7) and (11)-(12) into 
(A1) and then using (9) to eliminate k  yield 
 kkkkkkkkkkkkkMkk hIgIvp )1(])1([ln)(ln 1      
  kgykkkgykk yBByBB )()1()1(    .      (A2) 
Comparing the coefficients of kg  and ky  with their counterparts in (9), we obtain 
 
kkkkkk
gykk
g
y
I
BB
B
B




)1(
)1(


 ,  
which in turn requires kkkkgy IBB  .  Inserting it into (A2) yields the 
coefficients: 
M
kkvB  ,        
M
kkkkh IB  )1(   
M
kkkkkkkg IB   ])1([  ,     
M
kkkkkkky IB   ])1(1[  , 
M
kkkkkkky IB  )1(  ,      
11122 ])()([   kkkkkkkkk II  . 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: Note that  
 ])()()(ln[ln)][ln( kyykhkgkvkkk yBBhEBgEBvBvpvE  .     (A3) 
Recalling 
kk vgE ln)(  , kk vhE ln)(   and 1 hgv BBB , substituting the values of 
yB  and yB  in Proposition 1 into (A3), we obtain (22).  To compute )var( kr  we first note 
the following identity:  
)]|(var[)]|[var()var( kkkkk vrEvrEr  .         (A4) 
Since 
1)()|var(  kkkkk Ivg  , 
1])1([)|var(  kkkkk Ivh   and 
1)var(  kky  , we have 
)|var()|var( kkykhkgkk vyBhBgBvr   
      121212 ])1([)(   kykkkhkkkg BIBIB  .       (A5) 
Moreover, )|var()]|[var( kkkk vrvrE   since )|var( kk vr  is a constant.  On the other hand, 
(18) shows 
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 ])()|()|(ln[ln)|( kyykkhkkgkvkkk yBBvhEBvgEBvBvvrE  . 
Inserting kkk vvgE ln)|(   and kkk vvhE ln)|(   into it, we obtain kvkk vBvrE ln)|(  + 
constant, which implies 
12)]|(var[  kvkk BvrE  .  Substituting the last equation and (A5) 
into (A4) yields (23). 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: By definition, 
   kAkKj jjAjkkkA trrtrrE    1 )()( , 
     


 
K
k k
A
k
K
k kk
A
kAA trrtE 1
22
1
)(  . 
From (22), we have 
M
kkk yr   .  Substituting 
A
kt  into it and then using kA , we obtain 
 Ak
A
kk tr   AkA  . 
Multiplying both sides of it by 
A
kt  and then summing over all k yield 
    AKk kAkA tr    1
2
AAA  . 
The combination of the last two equations yields (24).  Multiplying both sides of (24) by 
kt  and then summing over all k yield (25). 
 
Proof of Proposition 4:  From (24), we have 
M
kMkk rcr   for all k.  Since )1,0(k  is 
not constant across k, so is kc .  Suppose 1kc  for all k.  Then, 
M
kMk rr   for all k.  
Multiplying both sides by 0Mkt  and summing over all k yield 


n
k
MMkM
M
kMM trr
1
  
Mr .  This contradiction implies that the assumption of 1kc  for all k is false.  By the 
same logic, 1kc  for all k is not true either.  Define 
1*  c .  Obviously, 
}){max},{min(* k
k
k
k
  )1,0(  is unique.  On the other hand, manipulating (25) 
yields 
M
PMPP rcr  .  Therefore, 
M
PM
M
PMP rrr  *  Pc .   
 Apparently, 1Pc  if *),0(  P .  Hence, 
M
PMP rr   if *),0(  P  and 
0MP .  Similarly, 
M
PMP rr   if )1*,( P  and 0
M
P .  
 Finally, 
A
k
M
k tt   for all k when k  is constant across securities.  Then, the IaMP 
and IaCAPM collapse to the market portfolio and Sharpe-Lintner CAPM, respectively. 
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Proof of Lemma 1: Claim (iii) is obvious so we first consider (i)-(ii).  For simplicity, we 
suppress subscript k, then 
 
)/()]/)1(1[)1(
)1()1(
222 
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





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M
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/)1(1/
222 III
II






 , 
where )/()(
222   II .  There are three cases under  .  First, 
consider the case that γI is finite and  .  This implies  , and clearly we 
have 1lim 



.  Second, ρ is finite and  .  This implies I .  Noting 




I
I
/lim , we obtain 
 
 I
lim 1
1/lim
)1(1/lim



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

I
I
I
I
. 
Finally, we consider the case that both   and I .  Since I
I



/lim


 exists, 
we obtain 
 
lim 1
1/lim
1/lim
,
,




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
I
I
I
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



. 
In addition, since  )1()1(  II
M , it is easy to verify that 


M

lim .  Hence, 



Mlimlim .   
When 0 , it implies both 0  and 0I .  Noting 0lim
0





I
 and 
0/lim
0


I
I


, it is clear that 0lim
0




.  Once again, we can easily obtain 
0limlim
00




M
. 
Now we show (iv)-(vi).  It has been shown that 
M
k  and k  with the 
same order when k .  So, from the definition of P , it is immediate that 1P  
when P  because P  implies k  for all k.  Next, 0P  implies 
that there exists at least one k such that 0k .  Since 0
M
k  and 0k  but 
0/  Mkkk   when 0k , we have 0 kP  .  Finally, recalling 
M
kk  0  
for all k, (vi) is obvious from the definition of P .    
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Proof of Proposition 5:  In empirical tests of the classic CAPM along the line of Fama 
and French (1992, 1993), all portfolios have non-negative weights and therefore their 
information indexes satisfy )1,0(P  according to Lemma 1.  Furthermore, Lemma 1 
implies that there exists a small and positive constant L  such that P  falls into interval 
*),0(   if LP   .  For all these portfolios, Proposition 4 shows that the Sharpe-Lintner 
CAPM overstates their expected returns.  The proof for part (ii) is similar. 
 
Proof of Corollary 1:  Define 
1
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.  For a portfolio in set LP , 
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1
1 
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  L
K
k kk
 .  Then, its market beta satisfies   
K
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M
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1minmin0
 .  The proof for portfolios in UP  is 
similar but L  should be defined as
1
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 UL haa  , where }{maxmax kk
k
h   and 
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110
max   
K
k k
K
k kkt
tyta
k
. 
 
Proof of Corollary 2:  The proof is obvious so that it is omitted.  
